How multinational banks in India gain legitimacy: Organisational practices and resources required for implementation by Caussat, Paul et al.
Vol.:(0123456789)
Management International Review
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11575-019-00387-6
1 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
How Multinational Banks in India Gain Legitimacy: 
Organisational Practices and Resources Required 
for Implementation
Paul Caussat1  · Nathalie Prime2  · Robert Wilken3 
Received: 4 May 2017 / Revised: 3 September 2018 / Accepted: 14 September 2018 
© The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Liability of foreignness (LOF) refers to the difficulties and additional costs that mul-
tinational enterprises face when they operate in a foreign market. Rooted in institu-
tional theory, extant literature has discussed isomorphism, transference, and socio-
political activism as legitimation strategies to counteract LOF. This view relates to 
the macro level of firm and society, assumes passivity of subsidiaries, and neglects 
implementation of these strategies. Consequently, this paper aims at complementing 
this restrictive view through a qualitative study to explore how French multinational 
banks respond to LOF challenges in India, an adverse institutional environment typi-
cal of emerging markets but also unique due to strong economic nationalism and cul-
tural traditions. As such, the present article contributes to the institutional research 
stream by (1) presenting an empirical investigation at the micro level of subsidi-
ary organisational practices to operationalise legitimation strategies in managerial 
terms; (2) revealing rhetoric proactive strategies beyond the passive or reactive paths 
identified previously; and (3) discussing the internal implications of implementing 
legitimation strategies directed at external recipients within the intraorganisational 
network of multinational banks, using the resource-based view.
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1 Introduction
The banking industry represents an exceptional context to investigate the so-
called liability of foreignness (LOF) that is, the difficulties and additional costs 
that multinational enterprises (MNEs) encounter when they operate in a for-
eign market (Zaheer 1995). First, as a tool for public policy implementation that 
involves money creation and circulation—an attribute of national sovereignty 
as important as defence or internal security–banking is in essence a politicised 
activity (Cole 2009;  La Porta et  al. 2002) that needs to remain under the con-
trol of local authorities. Second, foreign bank entry increases local competition 
and pushes local banks towards less profitable customer segments (the ‘cream-
skimming’ effect) (Gormley 2010; Mian 2006). Third, multinational bank (MNB) 
subsidiaries may act as a transmission channel of financial shocks (e.g., the 2008 
financial crisis) to the local market that the government tries to minimize (Jeon 
et al. 2013). In addition, the banking business essentially involves collecting and 
lending money to people, corporations, or public bodies, which requires access 
to ‘soft’ information (i.e., knowledge about local customers’ expectations and 
capacity to reimburse) and familiarity with which they can build mutually trustful 
relationships. In this regard, domestic banks are more familiar with local customs 
and have better access to soft information vis-à-vis foreign banking MNEs (Bhau-
mik et al. 2018; Claessens and van Horen 2012; Mian 2006).
The institutional literature in international business discusses strategies to 
mitigate the negative impact of LOF (Kostova and Zaheer 1999) by acquiring 
legitimacy—“the social licence to operate” (Ehrnström-Fuentes 2016,  p. 434). 
Research to date has emphasised three legitimation strategies directed at various 
external sociopolitical recipients (i.e., legitimacy providers), such as the regula-
tor and the media (Deephouse 1996): isomorphism (conformism to local institu-
tions), transference (partnership with legitimate local actors), and sociopolitical 
activism (establishing relationships with host and home governments).
However, some important gaps remain in the extant literature. First, these stud-
ies view the local subsidiary as a relatively submissive actor facing institutional 
constraints in which the management of LOF is based on a powerless or ‘passive’ 
adaptation to local rules (which is the case for isomorphism and transference 
strategies). Going further in institutional theory (Kostova et al. 2008), we ques-
tion the extent to which subsidiaries must remain passive; instead, we posit that, 
even in a context of high LOF, MNEs can proactively implement organisational 
practices to obtain legitimacy with sociopolitical actors.
Second, most studies on legitimacy conceptualise it as a macro phenome-
non (Bitektine and Haack 2015), which implies that they mostly investigate the 
impact of these strategies at the macro level of the (local) society and the (multi-
national) firm. This perspective ignores the concrete micro level of organisational 
practices that a subsidiary can implement to support legitimation strategies and 
reduce LOF. Kostova et  al. (2008) call for more agency and suggest rethinking 
institutional theory as less deterministic. Any strategy requires a certain amount 
of internal resources and the competence to make use of these resources to 
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achieve a strategic objective (Johnson et  al. 2017). Thus, to identify what com-
panies actually do in their attempt to pursue a legitimation strategy, researchers 
should focus on the micro level of organisational practices mobilised by country 
managers, which would also allow for more concrete and operational managerial 
implications.
Third, following the same argument, the macro level of analysis does not allow 
us to understand how the various legitimation strategies can be implemented inter-
nally, which can affect MNCs’ internal relationships between the local subsidiary 
and its headquarters. Country managers mobilise internal organisational practices 
(Dörrenbächer and Geppert 2006, 2012) to gain local strategic autonomy and to 
mitigate potential tensions between the need for internal resources when interacting 
with local sociopolitical actors and the demands for efficiency from the firm’s head-
quarters (Li et  al. 2016). Consequently, research should complement the external 
view of legitimation strategies (which are by definition directed at recipients outside 
the company) with an investigation into their intraorganisational consequences. Last, 
we lack empirical knowledge on these micro-level processes (i.e., organisational 
practices).
Consequently, the present research aims at enriching the institutional theoreti-
cal framework on legitimation strategies of MNEs in their foreign country markets. 
To (1) facilitate identification of strategies beyond the institutional framework of 
isomorphism, transference, and political activism and (2) be able to ask how these 
strategies are implemented internally at the level of the subsidiary, we use an explor-
atory, qualitative case-based study of three French MNBs that operate in India and 
their attempts to gain legitimacy in the host environment. In so doing, this research 
offers the following contributions. First, we present an empirical investigation into 
various legitimation strategies. Hereby, we use the micro level of organisational 
practices to operationalise legitimation strategies in managerial terms by reflecting 
on how country managers use them in a context of high LOF. Second, the explora-
tory, qualitative research design that we use allows us to identify rhetoric proac-
tive strategies as complementary to and distinct from the passive paths of isomor-
phism and transference and the reactive path of political activism. Third, using the 
resource-based view, we discuss the internal implications of implementing legitima-
tion strategies directed at external recipients within the intraorganisational network 
of MNBs.
Our study relies on a context especially suited to investigate legitimation strate-
gies resulting from high LOF: multinational banks (MNBs) and their subsidiaries 
in India. The Indian context is also particularly suitable as it represents an adverse 
institutional environment, which, although typical of emerging markets (Sheth 
2011), is also unique due to strong economic nationalism and cultural traditions. In 
addition, India is a favourable environment for investors considering its economic 
growth has made it one of the fastest-growing large economies over the past decade.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We proceed with a review 
of the theoretical framework, including the various legitimation strategies that 
we aim to complement. We next present the specific societal context of our study 
and the methodology applied. The section on the empirical results is the heart of 
our article and subdivides into (external) legitimation strategies and (internal) 
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intraorganisational implications. The discussion synthesises the findings and as such 
presents a nuanced picture of organisational practices that put various legitimation 
strategies (including proactive rhetoric ones), as well as internal implications, into 
action. We conclude by pointing towards fruitful avenues for future research.
2  Theoretical Underpinnings
2.1  The Eclectic Theory and the Liability of Foreignness
Many MNEs experience LOF, as evidenced by the vast international business lit-
erature devoted to the topic (Eden and Miller 2004; Zaheer 1995). The international 
business literature has discussed several solutions to the LOF problem of MNEs in 
general. A first stream of research shows that foreign internationalising firms can 
increase their local competitiveness by exploiting ownership-specific advantages 
(firm-specific advantages [FSAs]) that they have developed in their home country 
(i.e., tangible and intangible resources and competences) and that are not accessible 
to competition. The ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) paradigm (Dunning 
2009) provides an ‘eclectic view’ of how firms can search for the best combina-
tion of each OLI advantage and recommends specific entry strategies accordingly 
(the view is ‘eclectic’ in the sense that it simultaneously considers all the types of 
advantages—namely OLI advantages—that firms can benefit from when they inter-
nationalize). Foreign MNBs typically have FSAs (relating to the ownership and 
internalization dimensions of the OLI paradigm) when competing abroad, especially 
specific knowledge and assets (e.g., technicity, foreign capital, positive country-of-
origin brand reputation) (Aichner 2014; Claessens et  al. 2001) and internalisation 
capacities (e.g., the ability to integrate banking operations efficiently between head-
quarters and subsidiaries). These capacities allow MNBs to control their assets more 
effectively, reduce asset-sharing risks, and be more cost-efficient through a wholly 
owned subsidiary (WOS) than they would be in a partnership with a local firm 
(Dunning 2009). When developing abroad in countries that display location advan-
tages, such firms will typically choose a WOS to benefit from the combination of 
OLI advantages.
However, rooted in an economic perspective, this body of research is more con-
cerned with entry mode selection and the efficiency of MNEs’ investment decisions 
(Santangelo and Meyer 2017) than with the question of how to circumvent frequent 
adverse local conditions and LOF. Scholars point out that the OLI paradigm may 
not be sufficient in explaining internationalisation decisions to enter distant (or high 
LOF) markets (Buckley and Ghauri 2004; Buckley et al. 2016), as it can undermine 
the question of local sociopolitical dynamics around the expansion of MNEs into 
the targeted environment. In contexts of high LOF, foreign actors can potentially 
face discrimination from a range of actors, including nonbusiness entities such as 
the government ([Li et al. 2013] in the case of domestic firms in transitional econo-
mies) as well as other influential local actors ([Barros 2014] in the case of Petro-
bras when interacting with local media). This discrimination reduces the capacity 
to deploy and benefit from potential advantages of FSAs and may discourage the 
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firm from deciding in favour of a WOS. These obstacles are particularly relevant in 
the banking sector, in which the regulator, a key sociopolitical actor, is more likely 
to grant preferential treatment to domestic actors (Claessens and van Horen 2012). 
Moreover, it can be difficult to benefit from the ‘location advantage’ (i.e., the incen-
tive to undertake value-adding activities in a specific foreign market) when no physi-
cal production takes place in the host country (Hennart 2012), which applies to the 
banking sector.
2.2  An Institutional Framework to Account for the Development of Multinational 
Banks in a Distant Environment
The international business literature has a long history of investigating business net-
works and interfirm relationships as a determinant of firms’ international expansion. 
In contrast, studies have focussed less on relationships between firms and sociopo-
litical actors (Hadjikhani et  al. 2008). Using institutional theory, a second stream 
of literature argues that foreign firms can reduce the negative impact of LOF and 
increase the value of their FSAs abroad by seeking legitimacy in the local environ-
ment (Suchman 1995). Institutional theory is concerned with how institutions shape 
the behaviours of organisations: ‘Old institutionalism’ (Selznick 1996) focuses on 
formal institutions, dynamics, and agency, and ‘neoinstitutionalism’ is more con-
cerned with cognitive processes and the reproduction of behaviours across organi-
sations (“What makes organizations so similar?” [DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 
147]). Organisations such as MNEs are typically driven more by social processes 
shaped around the quest for legitimacy than by rational and economic mechanisms, 
because they need to establish a trustworthy position (Hadjikhani and Sharma 
1999). Such organisations need to meet the expectations of legitimacy providers to 
enable their existence (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Suchman 1995). In the banking 
industry, the most notable legitimacy providers are regulators and the media (the 
latter being viewed as a barometer of civil society and normative institutions) (Bar-
reto and Baden-Füller 2006; Deephouse 1996). Such a legitimation strategy helps 
foreign firms overcome their LOF and reduce the failure rate among foreign market 
entrants (Singh et al. 1986).
International business researchers using institutional theory have mostly consid-
ered this theoretical framework in a neoinstitutionalist perspective, thereby putting 
legitimacy acquisition and perpetuation at the centre of a firm’s survival in a foreign 
environment. This research stream has mainly discussed two legitimation strategies: 
local isomorphism and transference. Isomorphism strategy recommends that for-
eign firms establish WOSs that conform to local formal and informal rules, through 
mimicry behaviours and adaptation of products, operations, and local organisation 
(Kostova and Roth 2002; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Salomon and Wu 2012). This 
strategy is particularly recommended when the activity is politically sensitive, is 
subject to extensive regulatory scrutiny, and/or exhibits customer-centric features 
(all traits that characterise the banking industry). However, some researchers have 
criticised the local isomorphism strategy, noting that it may reduce the quality of 
the internal relationship with headquarters and overall firm organisational efficiency. 
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Consequently, isomorphism can challenge the balance between external and internal 
conformity (Li et al. 2016).
In contrast, the transference strategy recommends that foreign firms partner with 
a local actor, often through joint venture agreements (Lu and Xu 2006), because 
the local partner can accelerate learning about the environment and its key sociopo-
litical actors and cultural characteristics—thereby reducing LOF—and provide the 
foreign partner with the desired legitimacy (Chan and Makino 2007). The choice of 
entering into a partnership with a local organisation is linked to the level of control 
required but can also serve as a means to respond to institutional pressures from 
local sociopolitical actors (Yiu and Makino 2002). Selecting the right partner might 
be challenging, given the relatively low level of local knowledge (Gaur and Lu 
2007), which in fact simply creates another liability problem, namely the liability of 
outsidership (Johanson and Vahlne 2009). Integrating local networks to gain access 
to key sociopolitical actors can actually turn out to be more challenging than the 
liability of foreignness per se, especially in emerging markets (Elg et al. 2015), in 
which sociopolitical institutions (e.g., political and religious institutions, nongovern-
mental organisations [NGOs], local communities) often wield enormous influence 
(Sheth 2011). However, extant literature has mostly focussed on business networks 
and interfirm relationships rather than on building networks with local sociopolitical 
organisations (Hadjikhani et al. 2008).
2.3  Towards a Proactive Approach to Gaining Legitimacy
In both isomorphism and transference strategies, the local subsidiary is viewed as a 
relatively powerless actor facing institutional constraints. Local isomorphism refers 
to passive compliance with local rules, whilst transference implies a dependence on 
the local partner for compliance.
A third legitimation method proposed in the field of strategy (Holburn and Van-
den Bergh 2008; Peng et  al. 2009) puts forth the idea that firms resort to politi-
cal strategies to react to local regulatory adversities and turn unfavourable regula-
tions into favourable ones. In such an approach, political strategies are viewed as 
a means to actively strive for legitimacy vis-à-vis political actors. However, only a 
few international business studies explicitly link political strategies to the legitimacy 
framework (Meyer et al. 2014; Peng et al. 2009; Scott 2014). Instead, most studies 
on reactive legitimation strategies focus on the cultural-cognitive processes of legiti-
macy occurring at the macro level (legitimacy based on the society’s perception of 
foreign organisation) (Kostova and Zaheer 1999). This perspective implies a prede-
termined view of MNEs’ behaviour in a foreign market, with (too) little openness to 
study institutional changes. An exception is Edman (2016, p. 689), who, using an 
organisational identity approach, argues that “legitimacy in local environments need 
not necessarily be synonymous with conformity and isomorphism” and highlights 
the case in which being a foreigner does not always lead to being stigmatized, espe-
cially when foreign identity can bring value to local stakeholders. In the same vein 
and beyond mimicry behaviour, researchers have identified corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) actions as a means to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis local actors (Zhao 
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et al. 2014), especially in contexts of institutional voids as a substitute for missing 
regulatory institutions (Rathert 2016). CSR may also be pursued with the view to 
protecting corporate reputation with respect to the media and NGOs who track the 
behaviours of multinational enterprises (King 2008).
However, these studies have remained situated at a macro organisational level, 
while action typically takes place at the level of individuals within the organisa-
tion. More research is needed to investigate the micro-level foundations of legiti-
macy (Kostova et al. 2008) by investigating how actors make sense of their context 
and proactively shape the conditions of their legitimacy. In particular, this research 
field has a limited understanding of the multiple local sociopolitical actors involved 
when a foreign firm seeks legitimacy. Research focusing on foreign firms’ interac-
tions with local sociopolitical actors tends to consider these actors as a whole rather 
than studying each of them individually. Some scholars adopt a targeted approach by 
specifically investigating one type of actor. For example, Wu and Salomon (2017) 
focus on the regulatory pressures foreign firms face in the banking industry. How-
ever, a more holistic yet detailed approach to the local environment in which for-
eign MNEs subsidiaries operate is necessary to account for the overall ecosystem of 
MNBs and shed light on how they gain legitimacy. We thus identify a need to study 
the behaviour of MNE subsidiaries at the micro level of actions to understand the 
underpinnings of subsidiary legitimation, focusing on organisational practices lever-
aged by internal actors (and the resources required) that relate to external sociopolit-
ical actors. The following question comprises our study focus: Which organisational 
practices targeted at which specific sociopolitical actors, and requiring which kind of 
internal resources, do subsidiary-level actors undertake in order to gain legitimacy? 
Defined by Kostova and Roth (2002, p. 2016) as “an organization’s routine use of 
knowledge for conducting a particular function”, organisational practices encompass 
a variety of micro tools shaping a firm’s strategy and behaviour such as organisa-
tional tools (e.g., reporting lines, communication), human resource management 
tools (e.g., recruitment, career management, evaluation and remuneration packages), 
marketing tools (including offering, branding, and communication), and CSR policy 
tools. By targeting specific local sociopolitical actors, these practices act as imple-
menters of subsidiaries’ internationalisation strategy in the host environment.
3  Research Context and Methodology
Overall, extant theories on how MNEs (a) manage LOF in distant markets and (b) 
can still make effective use of their FSAs relate to the macro level of firm and society 
and assume passivity of subsidiaries. They also neglect the implementation side of 
these strategies, especially the resources the subsidiary must obtain to support them 
(i.e., resource-based view of strategy) (Barney 1991). To complement this restrictive 
view, we conducted a qualitative study to explore how French multinational banks 
respond to LOF challenges in India, an adverse institutional environment typical 
of emerging markets but also a unique setting due to strong economic nationalism 
and cultural traditions. This study (1) identifies legitimation strategies other than the 
known passive or reactive ones and (2) allows us to extend the existing institutional 
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theoretical framework by uncovering (a) the organisational practices that operation-
alise the legitimation strategies and (b) the resources that are used to implement 
these practices.
3.1  Research Context: The Banking Industry in India
Following the well-documented single-country multiple case study methodology 
(Yin 2014), this study depicts the core internationalisation strategic decisions of for-
eign banks in India. Following economic liberalisation from the late 1980s onwards, 
the Indian banking sector is today typical of a transitional economy (Mian 2006), in 
which public banks account for 72% of the market (asset ratio in 2015), old private 
sector banks for about 5%, new private sector banks for 16%, and foreign banks for 
approximately 7% of market share. Many public banks are heavily indebted due to 
bad loan policies, state interference, and, more generally, poor organisational perfor-
mance. Old private sector banks broadly share similar features and are slowly disap-
pearing from the Indian banking landscape. New private sector banks have modern 
technological management features with standards similar to those of their Western 
counterparts. More than 40 foreign MNBs are present in India, mostly Anglo-Saxon 
(e.g., Standard & Chartered, HSBC, CitiBank, Barclays), along with a few other 
nationalities (e.g., Deutsche Bank, DBS, BNP Paribas) in terms of assets, activities, 
and branches.
Despite differences in their historical presence and size, MNBs share a few char-
acteristics. First, they are all embedded in the same institutional and regulatory 
framework and, although some of them have well-diversified activities across the 
banking spectrum (retail, commercial, and investment), the majority focus on com-
mercial banking activities. Second, they all have wholly owned operations with a 
limited number of partnerships with local firms in specific niche areas (e.g., life 
insurance, home finance). The Indian central bank (i.e., the Reserve Bank of India 
[RBI]) has been wary of foreign entities and has prevented them from achieving 
strong positions in the country, by granting licences to operate piecemeal while plac-
ing punctilious requirements on them (e.g., requiring daily reporting procedures). 
For a foreign MNB, it remains difficult to fulfil these requirements, which has led 
to high administrative pressure and a limited survival rate. Many foreign banks have 
in fact given up their banking licence in India. Even though the Indian market has 
high potential, relatively few companies have been able to grow significantly in the 
country in general and even fewer in the banking industry: Between 1999 and 2009, 
the ratio of foreign banks’ assets to total assets in India has remained stagnant at 6% 
(Claessens and van Horen 2012).
Sheth (2011) states that emerging economies tend to strongly influence socio-
political institutions in the form of religion, state interference, NGOs, and local 
communities, and India is no exception: The embeddedness of business networks 
and activities within certain traditional social communities has survived economic 
liberalisation through interlocking directorships and human resource management 
practices (Chen et al. 2015; Lachaier and Clementin-Ojha 2008; Naudet and Dubost 
2016). In this respect, it is a prerequisite for foreign companies to embed themselves 
into local business networks to reach customers.
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3.2  Research Methodology: A Single‑Country Multiple Case Study
Our single-country multiple case study methodology allows us to accommodate the 
aforementioned research context and focus on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings (Eisenhardt 1989). Thereby, it enables us to better grasp phe-
nomena that are deeply embedded in their context (Yin 2014).
The three French foreign bank subsidiaries present in India represent the sample 
units. Overall, data stem from representatives of, or experts on, foreign bank sub-
sidiaries in India; the qualitative information these people provide relates to organi-
sational practices directed at external recipients (legitimation strategies) as well as 
intraorganisational means to implement these strategies (internal implications).
The three banks operate similarly and in comparable segments, and their history 
is somewhat analogous, if not intertwined. Because they are French, the banks under 
study have higher LOF levels than English and colonial-related banks, which may 
have accumulated more experience and political connections over time (for more 
details on the sample units, refer to Table 1). We determined that the cases are typi-
cal (Yin 2014), displaying activity that reflects how foreign banks usually operate 
in India, rather than extreme (e.g., that of British banks benefitting from postcolo-
nial ties, that of new entrants such as the Emirati bank). In particular, French banks 
are typical non-Anglo-Saxon foreign banks in India, and the period of the research 
(between 2014 and 2016, long after the 2008 crisis and its immediate consequences) 
is also ordinary, which helps strengthen the external validity of the study.
The unit of analysis is the organisational practices of French MNBs’ Indian sub-
sidiaries in the local environment as well as inside the organisation. To help us focus 
on the micro level of the organisation, data include primary information from in-
depth interviews (IDIs) with country managers and senior position-related bank-
ers within the subsidiary or at the headquarters: three IDIs with a country manager 
(French bank 1), one IDI with a country manager and three interviews with manag-
ers based at headquarters who work in the risk management division (French bank 
2), and one IDI with a country manager (French bank 3). Because we interviewed 
six French participants more than once, a total of ten interviews emerged. We con-
ducted interviews in English or French, sometimes in Hindi (for certain Indian man-
agers), and they lasted one to one and a half hours. The interview guide consisted of 
semistructured questions pertaining to three major subtopics relating to legitimation 
strategies implemented in the Indian sociopolitical ecosystem relevant to foreign 
banks and to their internal consequences (see Appendix 1 for the interview guide): 
(1) subsidiary interactions with local sociopolitical actors (i.e., regulators and gov-
ernment agencies, media, civil society organisation, local competitors, and local 
customers); (2) subsidiary initiatives to reach out to sociopolitical actors; (3) sub-
sidiary interactions with headquarters with regard to negotiating the local strategy. 
Interviews were not recorded, as many respondents were worried about data confi-
dentiality and noted that they needed to obtain headquarters’ authorisation.
To increase external and internal validity, we conducted source, data, ecologi-
cal, and methodological triangulation (Denzin 1978). The following subsections 
describe each in more detail.
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3.2.1  Source Triangulation
Due to confidentiality and response biases inherent to the banking sector, we com-
plemented the set of primary data from French banks with interviews with other 
actors in the foreign banking sector (see Table 2): Overall, we interviewed five coun-
try managers from non-French foreign banks (eight interviews in total: three German 
banks, one Singaporean bank, one United Arab Emirates bank, two South African 
banks, and one Canadian bank); one financial analyst working for the largest Indian 
private equity firm; three journalists (two Indian journalists, including one banking 
and finance editor of a leading daily journal and one French journalist based in India 
for 10 years); one public relations agency officer and one consultant specialising in 
foreign banks in Asia; and five corporate employees whose companies are clients of 
French banks (nonbanking foreign subsidiary CEOs and Indian Business Groups’ 
top managers). For non-French foreign banks, the interview guide follows a simi-
lar structure. For nonbanking foreign subsidiary CEOs, we also included questions 
regarding their perception of domestic and foreign banks. For interviews with jour-
nalists, we asked a general question regarding the gap between domestic and foreign 
banks and the perception of foreign banks. This second set of interviews enabled us 
to collect two types of additional primary data regarding (1) foreign banks in general 
and their interactions with local sociopolitical actors and (2) French banks. We did 
so to triangulate and complement data given by French bank subsidiary CEOs, who 
were sometimes not willing to disclose what they perceived as sensitive information.
3.2.2  Data Triangulation
To not only minimise selection bias but also confirm primary data provided by 
directors of Indian French banks’ subsidiaries and other directors from other foreign 
banks, we complemented the primary data with secondary data collection aimed at 
documenting the characteristics of Indian economy and regulations applied to for-
eign banks, as well as information about the banks under scrutiny (historical data 
about the banks in India, organisational charts, performance, and biography of direc-
tors). These secondary data fell into two categories (Yin 2014):
Table 2  Triangulation of primary data sources
Interviewee profiles Number of people inter-
viewed
Number of in-depth inter-
views (several per inter-
viewee)
Bankers 11 18
Financial analyst 1 1
Press journalists 3 3
PR agency and consultants 2 3
Bank corporate customers 5 7
Total 22 32
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1. Documentation, which covers the following: all documents in open access and 
internal to the banks that interviewees provided during the interviews, collected 
from September 2015 to July 2017 (financial and annual reports, CSR reports; 
public relations documents, documentation about the history of the banks [e.g. 
French Bank 3’s booklet published on the occasion of its 100-year anniversary]); 
academic documents emanating from international institutions and academic con-
ferences and seminars about the Indian economy, politics, and the banking sector; 
nonacademic documents related to the Indian economy, politics, and the banking 
sector from consulting firms and the press identified in Factiva data base (local 
press such as the Economic Times, Business Line, Indian Express, Hindustan 
Times, Front Line, and international press such as Le Monde, Financial Times, 
and The Economist); and documents about foreign and Indian banks collected 
from RBI’s database (bank assets, deposits, performances, number of branches, 
amount of local capital, and loan default rates).
2. Archives: We accessed the archive centres of French bank 1 (two sessions of 
4 h each) and French bank 2 (one session of 4 h), which contained information 
about the international expansion of the banks, the international motivations and 
obstacles, and the activity of their Indian subsidiary (i.e., notes, correspondence, 
pictures, organisational charts, quantitative data, internal reports about the Indian 
political, economic and legal situation, and historical data).
3.2.3  Ecological Triangulation
Most interviewees were reluctant to be recorded; therefore, we took manual notes 
and later transcribed them. We submitted these notes to the respondents for reliabil-
ity checks, and we included their modifications in our data.
3.2.4  Methodological (Tool) Triangulation
In addition to primary data collection, we added secondary data such as press arti-
cles (extracted from Factiva search and a daily press review), annual reports, finan-
cials, archived documents retrieved at headquarters archive centres, and website 
content analyses. This rich set of data provided insights into the regulatory environ-
ment, MNBs’ performance in India and key stakeholders in the banking industry 
and within each MNB. Crossing primary and secondary data allowed us to obtain a 
more comprehensive and accurate picture of how foreign banks develop their pres-
ence in India.
To analyse the total set of secondary and primary data combined, we first used 
a thematic analytical strategy guided by extant theory (Eisenhardt 1989), espe-
cially Li et  al. (2016), who suggest that legitimation strategies are grounded in a 
relational process engaging several actors simultaneously (the ecosystem of the sub-
sidiary composed of the legitimacy providers located in the host and organisational 
environments). We retained two analytical themes: (1) legitimation strategies that 
emerge through organisational practices supporting interactions with local socio-
political legitimacy providers (e.g., government agencies and regulators, media and 
civil society, local competitors, local customers) and (2) internal organisational 
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implications in the form of intraorganisational practices supporting legitimation-
seeking interactions with internal actors.
Second, we analysed the data using a ‘cross-case pattern’ perspective (Eisenhardt 
1989), through which we identified similarities and differences between the three 
French banks. As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 30) suggest, “case researchers 
need to escape the ‘idiosyncratic detail’ of individual cases and conclude with only 
the relationships that are replicated across most or all of the cases”. We therefore 
only report the results of cross-case patterns that emerged from our familiarity with 
the whole set of data, which we progressively organised on the basis of within-group 
similarities (the three French banks), coupled with within-group and intergroup dif-
ferences (the three French banks compared with each other as well as other foreign 
banks).
4  Empirical Findings on Legitimation Strategies: Rhetoric Strategies 
Beyond Isomorphism, Transference, and Political Activism
4.1  Isomorphism to Local Institutional Conditions: Interactions 
with the Regulator
Most of the institutional work is carried out daily with the banking regulator—the 
RBI (Indian central bank). Given the centrality of the regulator, MNBs respond to 
legal duties and interact with it through organisational practices observable at the 
level of the organisation (conformity to the regulator’s requirements and collective 
lobbying) and country managers’ personal relations with the regulator. For the regu-
lator to grant a licence or any specific favour, foreign banks must justify why they 
are in India and how they are contributing to the Indian economy: “It’s true that 
we have to prove our raison d’être” (French bank 3 CEO). Similarly, “We put up 
billions of dollars on the table” (this firm had acquired the Royal Bank of Scot-
land’s Indian corporate asset portfolio). “This is a strong commitment with respect 
to the RBI” (Emirati bank CEO). In addition to pressuring foreign banks for com-
mitment, the regulator has also proved to be quite bureaucratic in its relationships 
with MNBs: “The regulator is very punctilious and intrusive. It is difficult to meet 
its requirements” (French bank 1 CEO); “Although the regulator carries out an 
overall audit only once per year, we (i.e., our bank) receive letters from him every 
week requesting some information” (French bank 1 CEO). In contrast, other for-
eign banks’ CEOs stated that the regulator was rather accessible: “When it comes 
to representing the bank’s activities in India, we can say that the regulator is very 
approachable—no need for any intermediary to talk to the regulator” (Singaporean 
bank CEO); “We talk to the regulator, try to understand what [he] wants. The regu-
lator is very approachable” (Canadian bank CEO). However, French bank 3 CEO 
noticed that since September 2016, when a new RBI governor was nominated, “It 
has become impossible to meet the RBI, [and] embassies say the same thing. The 
RBI governor is inaccessible and very silent. We miss the former governor.”
Therefore, country managers have tried to engage in interactions with the regula-
tor: “In addition to office work, there is also an institutional representation work: 
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French and European institutions in India […]. French bank CEOs meet very regu-
larly, less often than with other European banks. It’s mostly the case at European 
Business Group meetings: We produce a yearly brief for the public authorities. 
It’s like lobbying regulatory institutions” (French bank CEO 1). One key issue for 
foreign MNBs in India relates to their collective organisation: “Foreign banks are 
institutionally very poorly organised: There is no professional association. There is 
the IBA [i.e., Indian Banks Association] but the agenda of the IBA is very domes-
tic. Large Anglo-Saxon foreign banks do not need professional associations; they 
already have their own institutional channels and want to protect this advantage 
vis-à-vis other foreign banks. They do not need any sectorial organisation” (French 
bank 3 CEO). All MNB country managers agreed on the need to approach the regu-
lator routinely. Complying with demands is central to this process; thus, we consider 
it isomorphic from a coercive point of view. Although MNBs in India spend sig-
nificant resources developing relations with the regulator, the lack of institutional 
rooting and the inability to organise collective actions remain essential challenges. 
Indeed, several foreign MNBs have recently withdrawn from the Indian market (e.g., 
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in 2016). However, French MNB subsidiar-
ies—despite complaints regarding the high level of bureaucratic management—have 
been able to meet the regulator’s requirements.
4.2  Transference: Interactions with Local Partners
Although French MNBs typically operate through wholly owned subsidiaries in 
India, the MNBs studied herein have established partnerships with small local actors 
in niche banking segments, including life insurance, securities services, and home 
finance. These joint ventures operate independently and are thus loosely coordi-
nated: “We also have Amundi, a [joint venture] with State Bank of India, which is 
another subsidiary of our group. We have regular exchanges with Amundi but no 
common business” (French bank 1 CEO); “We acquired Sharekhan [a digital retail 
broker], which is a further step towards developing our non-wholesale and non-
banking franchise in India” (French bank 3 CEO). These partnerships help French 
banks justify their commitment to India to the regulator through know-how transfers 
and gain local knowledge and contacts.
To a more limited extent, the three French MNBs have all partnered to address 
the specific needs of local financial actors (e.g., in-home finance, retail banking). 
These partnerships are peripheral to the subsidiary’s core business, but they never-
theless allow entry into potentially promising future markets. Through transference 
strategies, they have all designed an organisational structure benefitting from local 
partners’ local knowledge and legitimacy, while demonstrating to the regulator a 
commitment to transferring know-how to local actors.
4.3  Political Activism: Interactions Between Governments
Interactions at the highest political level remain elusive for the French MNBs, even 
though core decisions regarding entry into the Indian market, along with the number 
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of branches across the territory (i.e., distribution), mostly lie within the host govern-
ment. The following statement illustrates how crucial political relationships are in 
this industry: “If your government has a good relationship with the government of 
India, banks are more successful. This is just a point to keep in mind” (Singaporean 
Bank CEO). Intergovernmental relations represent the backbone of international 
banking development, consistent with the national sovereignty characteristics of the 
banking industry.
To enter the market, foreign banks must obtain a banking license, which requires 
a long process that has more to do with political than business negotiations. 
Throughout this process, regulators tend to adopt a conservative approach to pre-
vent foreign banks from gaining too large an access to the Indian market, so that 
they ensure that they meet World Trade Organisation obligations, as stated by Shaji 
Vikraman, in the daily The India Express: “The power to grant licences to banks, 
both domestic and foreign, lay with the central bank and were laid out in the RBI 
Act. But to determine the number of branches for foreign banks in India, and to 
ensure compliance with international rules like those specified by the World Trade 
Organisation, the Ministries of Finance and Commerce too were involved” (Licens-
ing foreign banks: RBI’s caution and a hard lesson, April 5, 2017). More precisely, 
a committee composed of central bank and government representatives makes the 
decision regarding the number of branches to be granted to the foreign bank: “The 
proposals of foreign banks intending to start their Indian operations, either through 
branch operations or representative offices, are vetted by a high-powered committee 
which includes representatives from the home ministry, finance ministry, Reserve 
Bank of India and intelligence agencies.”
Archive documents from French bank 2 reveal that the license acquisition pro-
cess depends considerably on intergovernmental relationships. French banks 1 and 
2 sought a licence to operate in India at around the same period (beginning in the 
1980s). A French bank 2 internal note states: “The decision between several same-
country candidates is based on: the applicant’s international standing reputation 
and pre-existing activities developed in India …[and] the anteriority of the licence 
request, conditioned by recommendations formulated by home country authorities”. 
The latter aspect highlights the importance of French authorities in shaping the deci-
sion regarding the banking licence. In this particular case, it is interesting to note 
that there was a conflict between the French authorities and the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs on one side and the Ministry of Finance on the other, the former 
privileging French bank 1 and the latter French bank 2. Despite an audience with 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the decision was shaped in favour of French bank 1.
Moreover, political interactions do not cease even after the foreign bank has 
entered the market. French bank 3 CEO related how the Indian subsidiary has been 
at the centre of a political negotiation by connecting its clients with the Indian Min-
ister of Finance: “The Indian Minister of Finance was in Paris for an [Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development] meeting and went to Roland-Garros 
[a tennis tournament]. I got a phone call from one of my Indian clients asking if it 
was possible to get tickets with the Indian Minister of Finance. It was very easy for 
me to get the tickets through the headquarters. We were the three of us at the tennis 
match, I left them at some points: they discussed a lot as they had things to tell each 
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other. The goal was to see each other outside India.” This example illustrates that 
French bank subsidiaries in India, however small, are connected to key politicians 
and even establish a bridge between the corporate and the political worlds. They 
maintain corporate institutional relations with the support—when needed—of the 
headquarters. The case of India is particularly revealing, as the current political cli-
mate may not allow corporate employees to meet the government and discuss issues 
openly. Only outside the country can they talk freely.
To gain access to the Indian market, MNBs have established relationships with 
host and home governments. As a WTO member, India is required to open its mar-
ket to foreign MNBs, and yet this process is carefully monitored by both govern-
ments. French MNBs must spend a considerable amount of time lobbying for their 
entry to both governments in competition with their peers. However, these political 
interactions do not cease following their entry into the local market. Country manag-
ers reveal that they maintain a high level of political interactions at the crossroads 
between corporate clients and the government. The case of India is particularly 
revealing, as the current political climate does not allow business groups to discuss 
issues openly with the government inside the country. Such discussions can happen 
abroad, notably with the help of foreign MNBs, which often represent the overseas 
institutional and financial support of such business groups. Thus, French MNBs use 
political tools (home–host diplomatic relations and corporate institutional relations 
through the appointment of intermediaries) to secure a good relationship with the 
host government, which is less conservative than the regulator.
The political activism legitimation strategy involves the appointment of interme-
diaries, especially for French bank 2. Following an initial setback, described previ-
ously, French bank 2 continued to lobby the Indian government taking a different 
route, as stated in an internal note: “We’ve just met with some ‘middlemen’ to get 
the licence: Z—who is close to Indira Gandhi […] and S—met at the Duke and 
the Duchesse de la Rochefoucault”. In another internal note, French bank 2 also 
recruited “two advisors to facilitate our licence application: Mr. M—whose name 
should not appear as he is a ‘member of the family’, and Mr. G—[…] funded on our 
entertainment budget […]. We need to hide the payment source, especially his treat-
ment and flight tickets”. French bank 2 obtained the licence in 1984 at a time when 
Indo–French relationships were deepening significantly.
4.4  Rhetoric Legitimation: Interactions with Local Clients, the Civil Society, 
and the Media
We observe that political lobbying and regulatory compliance interactions are not 
sufficient to grow business; ultimately, the subsidiary’s survival depends on its 
capacity to attract local customers, which defines its local commercial performance. 
From this perspective, rhetoric strategies of legitimation aim at diffusing a positive 
image of the organisation and give a prominent role to communication to, and public 
relations with, key legitimacy providers. Our results suggest that rhetoric processes 
target three recipients: local customers (and indirectly local competitors), the civil 
society, and, to a lesser extent, the media.
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We start with the marketing perspective and first present interactions with local 
customers. In terms of relationships with clients, rhetoric strategies tend to be sup-
ported by three categories of practices: a specialization offering strategy carefully 
communicated to the market, an ethical reputation in brand management heavily 
emphasized in the communication with clients, and the management of customer 
relationships adapted to the Indian culture. The first two heavily rely on the transfer-
ence of a global expertise and ethical reputation from the headquarters to the subsid-
iary. The third relies on effective cultural sensitivity of the organisation concerning 
the host environment.
Looking in detail at the three categories of practices used in rhetoric strategy, we 
first note that French MNBs tend to specialise in a set of corporate activities based 
on exclusive competences that local banks do not possess, and they carve out mar-
ket niches where they can enjoy monopolistic positions. French bank 3 CEO says: 
“We bring funding to the Indian economy where Indian banks cannot go” (e.g., they 
engage in international operations, especially those involving MNBs’ home markets, 
offering services such as foreign exchange and access to capital markets). They also 
accompany Indian firms abroad by providing a range of services (e.g., tax payments, 
salary treatments, customs guarantees). No Indian bank has the capacity to follow 
its customers in Europe, and similarly, no French bank has the capacity to follow 
an Indian company in the United States (this business accrues to American banks): 
“If an Indian company wants to take over a firm in Europe, there will be no Indian 
bank to support it in Europe; therefore, the company has to rely on a bank present in 
Europe. […] More generally, each bank has geographical specificity; no bank can 
cover the whole world” (French bank 3 CEO).
We found that MNBs communicate about their superior expertise in designing 
complex products according to customers’ requirements and/or a specific sector: 
“There are many areas where Indian banks do not master the expertise, for instance 
in personal finance derivatives” (French bank 3 CEO); “There is a knowledge and 
technical expertise gap with Indian banks, who lag behind foreign banks by far in 
this respect” (French bank 1 CEO). In a similar vein, French MNBs have devel-
oped expertise in certain specific sectors (e.g., French Bank 1 is a worldwide leader 
in aviation financing) and hold certain clear advantages over other MNBs: “French 
banks are known to be good at structuring and in project finance” (German bank 
CEO), so that they can make use of this expertise rhetorically. French MNBs, as 
with many other MNBs (at least in India), are known for their high levels of service. 
Being a client of a foreign bank allows one to enjoy higher service quality, which 
Indian banks cannot provide currently (though some local banks, especially in the 
new private sector, are catching up quickly). For French bank CEO 3, “Banking 
business requires a high level of trust and a significant knowledge: We have [had] 
relations with Volkswagen for a very long time, for instance, not General Motors. 
Indian banks can’t do business with European companies as their level of knowl-
edge is not enough.”
Second, rhetoric strategies used in the marketing context are based on MNBs 
setting up compliance departments in charge of internal control (“The internal 
police”, German bank CEO). When it comes to complying with world-class ethical 
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standards, French MNBs retain a high reputation as well as governance advantage 
over local competitors:
“Our bank is known to be risk-averse, meticulous and to ask for many documents 
in order to mitigate potential risks to clients. When I was posted in Africa, our cli-
ents used to tell me that we were annoying. Yes, we are annoying, that’s true, but 
thanks to our meticulousness, for instance, we do not have any outstanding debts 
in the oil sector, where we are very much involved although prices are very low” 
(French bank 2 CEO).
“There have been significant issues around the Tata Mundra project [a large 
power plant project]. When contracting with Tata, we introduced a series of clauses, 
and today Tata is paying us, unlike Indian banks that need now to restructure their 
loans. We have a better risk assessment” (French bank 3 CEO).
However, a German bank CEO contradicted this view: “Japanese banks are very 
good in compliance, while French banks are lagging a little behind.”
These high ethical behaviour and reputation standards translate into awards that 
are displayed on websites and in corporate booklets. French bank 1, for instance, 
was nominated by the magazine The Banker as ‘Bank of the year 2007’ for its social 
and environment responsibility, and it is today the world leader in green bonds. Sim-
ilarly, Fortune magazine ranked French bank 3 the sixth in the world in its World’s 
Most Admired Companies list; it was also nominated as ‘Best Bank of the Year 
2008’ by The Banker magazine. French bank 2 received, in 2015, an Indian award 
for the best branding amongst small banks.
Finally, since the media and other civil society organisations are more likely to 
investigate MNBs at home and in respective host markets, these MNBs have devel-
oped strong ethical policies to cope with any negative reputation risk to their brand: 
“When appointing a French expatriate at the head of the subsidiary, this reinforces 
a discourse of governance under control and allows [us] to avoid the risk of cer-
tain practices such as corruption” (French Bank 1). Similarly, French bank 1 CEO 
put forward this specific action: “We stopped financing coalmine projects as well as 
coal-based power plants.” The three French banks also withdrew their participation 
in a mining project developed by an Indian business group in Australia, due to its 
proximity to a coral reef.
Third, rhetoric strategies used in the marketing context relate a customer relation-
ships management style adapted to the Indian culture. Respondents made it clear 
that business with local customers is contracted between Indians (French bank 1 
CEO: “Indians do business with Indians”). Therefore, those at the negotiation table 
are exclusively Indians. More precisely, all the MNBs studied herein resort to a sim-
ilar coverage model: Below the CEO, a few senior bankers are in charge of a port-
folio of personal contacts with top corporate managers in a specific industry, and it 
is their job to gain appointments with them. This coverage work is filled by Indian 
nationals, as they are deemed more knowledgeable about local business networks 
and negotiation practices. They can rely on customers viewing them as part of their 
in-group despite the foreignness of the organisation for which they work. Once a 
deal is potentially confirmed, the senior banker contacts the corporate investment 
banking team and asks for the right product expertise to suit the needs of local cus-
tomers—for instance, in terms of loan instalment conditions.
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Beyond the customer, the second category of recipients of rhetoric legitima-
tion strategy is the Indian civil society. Firms must show strong compliance with 
the country’s cultural and religious traditions. French banks’ subsidiaries grow in 
the respect of Indian traditions and display the desire to be perceived as natives. 
For example, the book about the history of French bank 3 in India [The History of 
(French bank 3) in India, 1860–2010 (2010), 115p] describes the local rituals mobi-
lized when a branch is opened: A Hindu prayer (Pooja) is executed following reli-
gious Hindu protocols, followed by the distribution of Indian confectionaries (lad-
doos) to employees. Another special Hindu prayer is used when antivirus software 
is installed on each computer, and afterwards, the computers receive a tikka (red 
religious mark affixed on the ‘forehead’ of computers).
French bank 2 also sponsors sports initiatives in India, and French bank 1 organ-
izes internal auctions benefitting NGOs and educational institutions. French bank 3, 
which has developed a vast CSR program that covers various domains, organized 
an exhibition on the theme ‘Women Changing India’ to celebrate the subsidiary’s 
150 years in India. The country manager of French bank 2 noted, “Responsibility is 
created everyday with clients. […] For example, our bank decided to step back from 
the coal sector. Responsibility in terms of addressing climate change is important for 
companies today, including banks.” More generally, MNBs also conduct a certain 
number of CSR activities in line with legal obligations: “We conduct CSR actions, 
but we do not go through a CSR agency. We have developed internal programmes 
managed by the HR department” (French bank 1). These initiatives are highlighted 
in the press and promoted on their website to reach civil society, customers, and 
the regulator. Indian nationals handle communication and public relations efforts in 
close collaboration with the headquarters and the country manager.
Finally, a third category of recipients of rhetoric strategies consists of the media. 
However, an interview with the economic editor of a leading economic daily reveals 
that the French MNBs in our study do not interact with local press to a great extent: 
“Reputation is something you’ve got to work on. For example, Citibank approaches 
journalists quite often. They meet the press regularly and they talk. British and US 
banks in general talk. European banks are quieter, which, as long as they face no 
problem, is fine. The day they are in trouble, the situation can very quickly worsen.” 
More than a possible country-of-origin effect, this reticence is attributable to the 
personality of the CEO, as a South African bank’s CEO mentions: “I like to talk. I 
often speak to the media. Also, it helps build the brand.”
5  Empirical Findings on Internal Implications Emerging From 
Legitimation Strategies
Legitimation strategies involve organisational practices that reflect a shift in the 
locus of control from the headquarters to the subsidiary. This necessarily leads to the 
emergence of tensions between the subsidiary’s local development strategy, which 
requires effectiveness, and the headquarters’ demands for efficiency and control. We 
next summarize the organisational practices mobilised to mitigate these potential 
tensions between the headquarters and the subsidiaries.
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5.1  Managing Central‑Local Tension When Designing Product Offerings
International banks are structured around a product/country matrix structure with 
the aim of reconciling the tension between the headquarters and the subsidiary. Sen-
ior bankers are responsible for coverage activities designed to develop and manage 
strategic relationships with large corporate clients. All French MNBs have set up 
marketing coverage teams inside their Indian subsidiaries based in Mumbai. Yet, 
the corporate investment banking division providing the technical expertise is based 
at the headquarters located in the regional hub (either Hong Kong or Singapore, or 
both). Therefore, subsidiaries simultaneously build close relationships with local 
customers and within the bank. However, within foreign MNBs, French banks have 
kept a specific model of highly centralised control alongside the matrix structure, 
which gives the local subsidiary very little room to manoeuvre: “There are three lev-
els of procedures: the headquarters, the business line or the region, and finally the 
country. I can implement an Indian strategy only if it does not clash with the head-
quarters’ strategy or that of the business line. This is quite centralizing” (French 
bank 3’s CEO).
In addition, the country risk division helps mitigate the tension between head-
quarters and subsidiary. Regularly, their teams visit to evaluate the risks associated 
with the country. French bank 2’s head of country risk division notes: “There is a 
conflict of interest problem: Risks need to be independent from business. The risk 
division is neither contingent to the subsidiary’s revenues nor to the headquarters’. 
When we visit foreign countries, there is always a possibility to be coaxed by the 
subsidiary CEO.” We note that the conflict between risks assessed at the headquar-
ters and opportunities developed at the subsidiary level can be subject to negotia-
tions when the country risk division visits the country. However, it may sometimes 
happen that the country risk division remains inflexible, as stated by French bank 
CEO 3: “Hinduja was a very problematic Indian business group 20  years ago, 
bogged down in corruption scandals. The headquarters forbade us to do busi-
ness with Hinduja. Today, we are still forbidden from doing business with Hinduja 
[although] the group is much more operational now. This is the role of the risk divi-
sion.” Thus, the subsidiary must comply with internal rules in terms of client choice 
when it becomes a touchy subject.
5.2  Managing Central‑Local Tensions When Addressing Cultural Identities
Managing cultural identities (national as well as corporate) is a central domain in 
which MNBs must make decisions to mitigate tensions between the central and local 
perspectives. On the one hand, MNBs must ensure strong corporate governance to 
avoid becoming too local; on the other hand, they must comply with local human 
resource management practices that cannot be changed because they reflect endur-
ing cultural traditions or because it is more advantageous to keep them local.
The promotion of headquarters’ identity to ensure strong corporate governance 
can be observed in decisions about staffing the head of the subsidiary. Because 
country managers oversee formulating the strategy of the local subsidiary in line 
with the group’s global strategy, they have a critical role: “The CEO is both the first 
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banker of the subsidiary and a representative. As a representative, the CEO has 
two roles: representing the bank’s activities in India and at the global level, pro-
tecting Indian activities within the bank’s management board” (Singaporean bank 
CEO); “A CEO has to both establish relations with clients and with institutions. This 
also depends on the character of the person. Some like to be in touch with the cli-
ents, for instance” (French bank CEO 2). When appointing the subsidiary country 
head, French banks show contrasts with other banks: “Only two types of banks have 
expats in their Indian entity: the French banks and the Japanese ones” (Canadian 
bank CEO). Other MNBs have all appointed an Indian national (i.e., a host-country 
national) at the helm of the Indian unit.
Interviewees expressed three arguments behind the choice of appointing a parent-
country national over a host-country national: aligning local working culture and 
global strategy, enhancing subsidiary governance, and overcoming linguistic bar-
riers with headquarters. First, when appointing parent-country nationals, the bank 
nominates an executive from the headquarters who will assume a representation role 
amongst the various institutional agencies and ensure alignment between local and 
global strategy. The parent-country national will bridge cultural differences between 
headquarters and the local unit: “An expat at the head of the subsidiary eases the 
work of the senior bankers by improving communication flow with the risk depart-
ment, establishing a link with the group’s strategy, and bridging the gap between 
Indian and French working culture” (French bank 1 CEO). Second, French MNBs 
nominate French nationals as country managers (with a rotation system: every few 
years, country managers are required to move as part of a preestablished high talent 
career path), with a view to monitor subsidiary governance better and avoid becom-
ing too local, especially in countries with high levels of corruption such as India: 
“French banks are rather cautious on this issue. Appointing an expat as the subsidi-
ary head strengthens the idea that governance is under control and mitigates risks 
related to certain practices such as corruption” (French bank 1 CEO). However, the 
Singapore bank CEO expresses a different view: “We do not have a colonial mind-
set, like sending a French person to represent the French bank in India”, and simi-
larly the German bank CEO noted: “French banks 2 and 3 are very Franco-French 
[…], managed by expats.”
Third, the linguistic barrier with the headquarters must be addressed to connect 
with the corporate culture. For the United Arab Emirates bank CEO who previously 
worked with French bank 1, the CEO staffing policy also depends on the medium 
of communication within the organisation: “Having a local at the head helps the 
organisation in the foreign environment, but a local has to be able to integrate the 
Indian unit within the group. You need the support of the headquarters. You need to 
speak French in this respect. When I was working with [French bank 1], I needed 
to learn French. I asked the bank to let me spend some time in France, and when I 
came back, I had learned a little bit of French. French banks are maybe less global 
in terms of communication but not in terms of business thinking: they are very 
global in this respect.”
Finally, country managers do not have much control over their senior bankers: 
“Senior bankers are evaluated by the headquarters […]. The country head has no 
decision-making capacity over the salary or the bonus of senior bankers. It is the top 
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manager in Paris. A good country head is one who has established good relations 
with top managers based out at the headquarters and who is then able to influence 
his/her senior bankers in the subsidiary” (French bank 2 headquarters top manager). 
Managing a subsidiary is essentially a relational occupation. Being able to influence 
headquarters-based top managers is a key success factor in subsidiary coordination.
If MNBs ensure the transfer of headquarters’ identity and original corporate cul-
ture, they also tend to integrate local identities that would be difficult to change when 
managing Indian employees and therefore adapt the headquarters’ organisational 
practices. For instance, French MNBs have retained titles such as ‘Managing Direc-
tor’ and ‘Senior Banker’ and have implemented a seniority-based motivation system 
(French bank 1 CEO): “This is a rank that reveals seniority. Within French banks, 
this denomination has been removed, because what matters for us isn’t seniority but 
the importance of the job and the employee’s skills. In India, the structure is pyrami-
dal and very hierarchical—seniority-based denomination remains.” This adaptation 
of human resource management tools also targets the central issue of how to keep 
Indian employees and avoid poaching by Indian private banks. Thus, foreign banks 
do not specifically try to compete in terms of salary but rather in terms of modern 
management styles that are attractive in a traditionally conservative Indian culture 
exposed to new management practices brought by foreigners (French bank 1 CEO: 
“Indian companies are characterised by a very pyramidal structure, while foreign 
banks, especially Western [ones], have flatter [structures]”). Moreover, some Indian 
managers pursue an international career, which helps increase awareness about India 
at the headquarters: “At [French bank 3 Asia], there are many Indians who quite 
logically understand India better. This helps reduce tensions. And also, there has 
been the exchange with Britain, which considerably reduces the cultural gap, unlike 
in Japan or Korea. My local management committee is very Anglo-Saxonised.”
However, this adaptation of headquarters practices can also reflect the desire to 
take advantage of local practices viewed as a prerequisite of commercial perfor-
mance of the subsidiary or even avoid the risk of being rejected because of cultural 
nonnegotiable issues from the Indian perspective. Local employees, especially man-
agers working in coverage activities, are the actors who make a link between the 
organisation and the local environment by bringing their portfolio of contacts. In 
India, business is done amongst Indians in terms of winning deals and managing 
customer relationships. “This is something one should clearly keep in mind: Indians 
do business with Indians” (French bank 1 CEO); “Business is contracted amongst 
local people. This is the senior banker’s job: they know very well the corporate sec-
tor and belong to the same networks […]. These people often belong to the Mar-
wari community [an influential business community in the banking sector]; they are 
cousins or have cousins in common, and they meet at wedding events” (French bank 
2 CEO). Avoiding relying on such traditional in-group identities that define ways of 
doing business in India would not only be ethnocentric, it would also compromise 
the subsidiary’s local performance.
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6  Discussion
Using the institutional framework complemented with the resource-based view on 
strategic implementation, our results suggest that MNBs in India use a combination 
of legitimation strategies targeted at external recipients based on specific organisa-
tional practices and that these strategies are enabled through specific resources from 
the headquarters that require subsidiaries to balance global/local tensions.
6.1  Gaining Local Sociopolitical Actors’ Acceptance Requires a Combination 
of Legitimation Strategies
Our results suggest that designing legitimation strategies in high LOF countries is 
based on a combination of four approaches: two more passive (isomorphism and 
transference), one reactive (political activism), and one proactive (rhetoric). Each of 
these strategies has specific objectives and is implemented through specific organ-
isational practices and supporting resources that overall contribute to gaining the 
licence to operate in India despite the negative impact of LOF (see Fig. 1; the num-
bers 1–3 are consistent with the contributions listed in the Introduction). This micro 
level of organisational practices is useful to draw a concrete picture of what MNBs 
(can) actually do to generate and organisationally implement legitimacy. Put differ-
ently, by breaking down the host environment into various actors, we are able to 
shed light on the legitimation processes at play in the day-to-day management of a 
banking subsidiary. Legitimacy must be crafted daily, the result of which needs to 
be appreciated at the level of the sociopolitical actor in question. This perspective 
implicitly advocates placing more power in the hands of the subsidiary in response 
to the call for more agency in institutional theory (Kostova et al. 2008); rather than 
passively enduring the local environment, subsidiaries should engage proactively in 
interactions through specific organisational practices to gain legitimacy and increase 
their local presence. It also calls for more attention to the headquarters–subsidiary 
relationships as a source of MNEs performance and competitive advantage (Kostova 
1998).
Our results also suggest that MNB subsidiaries must take into account both exter-
nal (i.e., government, regulators, society-level actors, and customers) and internal 
actors (i.e., local employees and country managers of the subsidiary and headquar-
ters-level actors of the group), as organisational practices are oriented towards exter-
nal actors but are internally established. They provide a link between micro interac-
tions occurring at the subsidiary level and broader macro processes of legitimation 
occurring at the level of the intraorganisational network (the group) and the external 
level (the country).
We also note that legitimation strategies are not independent. For instance, human 
resources management actions (e.g., appointing country managers, senior bankers 
and other local employees) are both ‘substance’ tools that respond to isomorphic 
pressures and ‘form’ tools that create a global (central)/local discourse regarding the 
subsidiary’s identity. Furthermore, legitimation strategies are not exclusive but com-
plementary, as country managers make use of more than one type of legitimation 
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strategy at the same time: MNB subsidiaries may become isomorphic (when com-
plying with the regulator and developing an adapted local offering) while benefitting 
from another entity’s legitimacy (when partnering with local actors) and also devel-
oping various rhetorical actions (whether localness or globalness is appropriate).
Finally, our results show that country managers occupy an institutional role at the 
heart of subsidiary decision making and a boundary role at the interface of the MNB 
and the host country. They manage internal pressures on efficiency and control, 
along with external demands for legitimacy vis-à-vis multiple sociopolitical actors 
(i.e., effectiveness goal) using specific organisational practices. In the case of rheto-
ric strategies, they articulate a global and a local identity by developing dual and 
potentially ambivalent discourses targeting different actors: localised discourses for 
local customers, media, and, to some extent, the regulator; globalised (centralised) 
discourses for the headquarters, the regulator, and, to some extent, local employ-
ees. They can mobilise local or foreign identities, depending on whether foreignness 
is a liability or an asset (Edman 2016; Pant and Ramachandran 2017). Our analy-
sis suggests that acquiring legitimacy in a context of high LOF requires subtlety to 
understand whether the recipients of legitimation strategies will find value in global 
(e.g., a world-class ethical brand) or local (e.g., respecting untouchable traditions) 
attributes.
Fig. 1  Legitimation strategies of French MNBs subsidiaries in India—objectives, practices, and 
resources
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6.2  Implementing Legitimation Strategies Requires Internal Support 
and Mitigation Competence of Central‑Local Tensions
Any strategy (here, legitimation strategies) requires resources to successfully reach 
its objectives (resource-based view) (Barney 1991), and as such, strategy fundamen-
tally connects the internal and external perspectives. The four legitimation strategies 
previously identified require a bundle of financial, human, organisational, techno-
logical, and marketing resources (see Fig. 1, right-hand panel). However, obtaining 
those resources is not easy or automatic. For subsidiaries to gain strategic autonomy 
without sacrificing their internal support, they must not only ensure they can deliver 
performance but also allow the headquarters to exert control over their operations. It 
requires that the country manager be able to mitigate central-local tensions, which is 
a key success factor of their capacity to use (internal) resources to achieve (external) 
legitimacy. Global–local tension is a fundamental marker of MNEs’ international 
challenges and decision making, especially in functions such as international mar-
keting, information systems, strategy, and human resources management (Prime and 
Usunier 2015). The subsidiary is the privileged place of interaction between interna-
tional and local actors, and it is logically confronted with tensions between the need 
for local legitimation strategies and for answering internal demands for efficiency 
and control from headquarters.
In this respect, the organisational practices mobilised at the subsidiary level to 
manage global (central) and local tensions connect actors from the local and head-
quarters levels. In particular, French MNBs have consistently appointed parent-
country nationals (i.e., French nationals) as country managers for communication 
purposes (‘the facilitator’), for governance control (‘the moderator‘), and to be the 
headquarters’ face when negotiating with the regulator (‘the representative‘). Simi-
larly, French MNBs’ Indian managers consider themselves more in an institutional 
position between the headquarters and the local environment than in the role of a 
pure local banker. This unique situation (French MNBs vs. other MNBs) highlights 
that organisational practices to support legitimation strategies abroad could reflect 
the original home culture of the parent company.
7  Conclusion
7.1  Findings and Contributions
This paper investigates how service-based MNEs overcome the LOF by seeking 
legitimacy in the local environment. The empirical study analysed the behaviour of 
three French MNB subsidiaries operating in India in relation to local sociopolitical 
actors. Due to the sensitive nature of the activity, MNBs are subject to a high level 
of scrutiny from local sociopolitical actors, especially the regulator and the media. 
In addition, because banking in essence is a relational activity, French MNB subsidi-
aries are likely to face difficulties in integrating local networks.
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Our paper extends existing literature on MNEs’ legitimation strategies to over-
come the liability of foreignness into distant foreign environment, in three related 
ways. First, we studied one specific actor central to international business yet often 
overlooked: multinational banks. We investigated MNBs’ interactions with a plural-
ity of sociopolitical actors that constitute the local environment (and did not just 
focus on one particular actor such as the regulator). Furthermore, we adopted a 
holistic approach by studying both the sociopolitical and cultural processes behind 
the legitimation phenomenon. We identified four legitimation strategies: two passive 
(isomorphism and transference), one reactive (political activism), and one proactive 
(rhetoric). Each of these strategies refers to specific actors and objectives but can 
be combined. Second, extant literature on MNEs in distant markets tends to study 
either the external or internal side of their operations. We looked at the interface 
between the external and internal environments of MNE subsidiaries. This enabled 
us to link legitimation strategies in the external environment to some internal con-
siderations. Third, we focused on the micro level of actions by studying actors and 
not organisational entities. By doing so, we were able to identify a set of organisa-
tional practices leveraged by subsidiary-level actors for each legitimation strategy. 
We connected these practices to the resource-based view framework to ultimately 
compare the external strategies developed at the subsidiary level with the internal 
resources required from the headquarters for their implementation. This allowed us 
to discuss ways to mitigate potential external/internal tensions.
7.2  Future Research
Beyond the scope of the present research, we suggest the following avenues for 
future investigations into legitimation strategies. First, as we suggest using the 
resource-based view to understand legitimation strategies, future research should 
address the important question of how to optimise those resources across strategies. 
For example, it seems relevant to consider the use of specific resources (typically 
human resources) for various strategies at the same time. Further research should 
also address the capability or competence of the subsidiary to make the best use of 
global (standard) versus local (unique) resources, such as–in the case of marketing 
resources—a global brand reputation that supports a localised product offering.
Second, in terms of data collection, we focused on external and internal interac-
tions of the MNBs; the points of view of the regulator or of local partners could 
complement the picture. We therefore recommend further studies considering the 
other side of sociopolitical interactions.
Third, because the confidentiality barrier in the banking industry is high, access 
to and research on this industry is difficult. Although we applied various triangu-
lation types, and despite our multifaceted results, we cannot claim that the list of 
organisational practices that reflect legitimation strategies and their implementation 
is exhaustive. Thus, our research findings could be examined in light of other ser-
vice industries that share similar features: wholly owned development to retain con-
trol over assets, tight regulation, and centrality of the regulator. In this respect, the 
telecommunication or modern retailing sectors, especially in emerging economies, 
would be relevant. We also argue in favour of a possible country-of origin effect 
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of organisational practices unveiled in this research, as the MNBs investigated all 
originate from France. In summary, future research could apply a similar research 
approach in a different environment (e.g., similar industries, various host countries 
of the same organisation, other countries of origin).
Fourth, data collection occurred from 2014 to 2016, in the midst of the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis, which forced many European MNBs to refocus on their home 
market. This may have caused biased results—not necessarily with respect to which 
organisational practices (the focus of our research) were employed, but perhaps with 
respect to their prominence or relative importance. Consequently, further research 
could address the degree to which MNBs resort to each of these strategies, depend-
ing on the level of exposure to LOF, using more applied cases than those presented 
herein.
Fifth, future research could explore the potential links between the home culture 
of the parent company of the MNB and legitimation strategies, as some supporting 
organisational practices may reveal a difficulty, or an advantage, of being ethnocen-
tric when growing abroad, especially in emerging markets.
Last, we acknowledge that Indian private banks are quickly catching up through 
imitation strategies and recruiting talents from foreign MNBs. The window of 
opportunity negotiated with the regulator might well come to an end. The changes 
that have occurred in the South Korean banking industry in the past 20 years could 
provide a useful benchmark against which to reflect on forthcoming industry changes 
in India. In short, more dynamic, long-term analyses (in contrast to the ‘snapshot’ 
perspective that characterises our research) could deepen our understanding of how 
legitimation strategies (and their internal implementation) can evolve over time.
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide
The interview guide is composed of three series of questions.
The first series relates to the host environment of the subsidiary and aims at iden-
tifying the external interactions with key legitimacy providers (i.e., the regulator, the 
media, civil society, competitors, and clients):
– Can you present the activities of the bank in India? What were the motivations to 
operate in India? Is India a strategic market for the bank?
– Which clients do you target? How do you approach your clients?
– What differentiates your bank compared to other foreign banks? Does the global 
reputation of the bank have an impact on Indian clients’ perception?
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– What is your relationship with the regulator? How do you approach it? Do you 
resort to diplomatic networks to interact with local political and regulatory 
spheres?
– How do you differentiate from local banks? What is the added value brought by 
foreign banks compared to local banks?
– What are your relationships with the press? How do you communicate? What 
CSR strategy do you develop at the local level? Who is in charge of communica-
tion and CSR?
The second series of questions relates to the organization and management of the 
subsidiary and aims at (1) better understanding organizational practices mobilized in 
the interactions with the client and (2) within the subsidiary (i.e., with employees, 
and the CEO):
– How are your Indian operations organised? How many branches do you have in 
the country?
– How many employees do you have in the subsidiary? What is the ratio between 
expatriates and locals? What are the positions of expatriates? Who are the senior 
bankers and how do you recruit them? What are the career opportunities offered 
to local employees?
– What makes your bank an attractive employer? What advantages do you propose 
to attract local talents?
– How is the performance of employees and senior bankers evaluated? What kind 
of performance evaluation tools do you use?
– What is the role of the CEO of a subsidiary? What are the daily tasks related to 
managing a subsidiary? Considering a typical week, how do you allocate your 
time to key activities? Whom do you report to?
The third part relates to the relationships within the intraorganisational network 
of the subsidiary and aims at identifying the internal interactions and organizational 
practices mobilized to support them:
– To whom do the senior bankers report? Has a global structure been imple-
mented? What is the role of the regional hub within the group and how does it 
work with the subsidiary?
– Where is the local development strategy designed? Who validates its implemen-
tation? How does the subsidiary coordinate with the headquarters and other sub-
sidiaries of the group? In case of disagreements between the subsidiary and the 
headquarters, how is this conflict managed?
– What is the role of the compliance and risk management department? How do 
they interfere with the subsidiary activities?
– What is the language used within the group?
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